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THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE. By Bruce E. 
Cain.t Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press. 1984. Pp. xii, 201. $24.50. 
Ward Elliott2 
California has been the scene of many battles in a bloody, 
costly, reapportionment war that has intensified since 1981, and 
whose outcome may determine who runs the California legislature 
for the rest of the century. The combatants have been strategists 
and incumbents of both parties; blacks, Hispanics, and commu-
nity representatives all clamoring for more power; and coteries of 
technical experts plying their computers, maps, and data bases to 
hold or gain as much ground as they could for their respective 
employers. 
The author of this book, a professor of political science, was 
one of the technical experts, a protege and employee of Demo-
cratic Assemblyman Richard Alatorre, chairman of the Assembly 
Elections and Reapportionment Committee. What he sees and 
what he misses are decisively influenced by his experience on 
Alatorre's committee. 
What he sees and explains effectively, though sometimes rep-
etitiously, are the technical problems of reapportionment and the 
problems of getting Democratic assemblymen to assent to the 
committee's plan. He writes knowledgeably of ripple effects and 
displacement, of uses and abuses of demographic data, of the dy-
namics of packing or dispersing voters of various groups to en-
hance or diminish their effective votes, and of the inevitable 
tradeoffs of some kinds of districting objectives against others. He 
has a good stock of war stories of how different Democratic legis-
lators came to terms with Alatorre and his staff, with most want-
ing safe seats, but some also wanting a home, a relative, or a 
favorite bar incorporated into their new district. He discusses bar-
gaining strategies for vote trading, including two instances in 
which Alatorre and Speaker Willie Brown, with the cooperation 
of their staffs, faked or suppressed information to bring a fellow 
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Democrat into the fold.3 He sagely warns that "[a] legislator who 
is informed about such things has a much stronger position."4 He 
also hazards some hypotheses about the bargaining process and 
concludes, unsurprisingly, that incumbents are "risk-averse and 
cautious" and "choose their voters so as to increase their chances 
of winning."s 
What he misses, for the most part, are ( 1) the other five-sixths 
of the reapportionment battle of 1981: the Republican side of the 
Assembly apportionment, the Senate apportionment, and, most 
controversial, the Congressional apportionment; (2) the blitz of in-
itiatives, court hearings, and public outcry that the 1981 appor-
tionments provoked from 1982 to 1984; and (3) the question of 
what kind of reapportionment system these might commend. 
The Reapportionment Puzzle is, as one chapter title puts it, "A 
Tale of One Reapportionment," that of the California Assembly, 
of one political perspective, Democratic, and of one year, 1981. 
The other two apportionments of 1981, Senate and Congressional, 
though more controversial than that of the Assembly, receive only 
cursory treatment. The analysis of the Republican side is a carica-
ture compared to that of the Democratic. And one would never 
guess from reading the book that California voters in June, 1982 
passed three initiatives to undo the 1981 reapportionments by lop-
sided majorities, nor that three more initiatives were introduced in 
1982, 1983, and 1984 to put reapportionment in other hands than 
those of a self-serving legislature. The 1982 Common Cause initi-
ative (Proposition 14) would have set up a hybrid bipartisan/non-
partisan commission with appeal to the California Supreme 
Court. The voters rejected it. The 1983 Sebastiani initiative 
would have asked for a yes or no on alternative districting plans. 
Democratic leaders spoke of it as "Armageddon," and the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, voting on straight party lines, struck it down. 
The 1984 Deukmejian initiative calls for a commission of four for-
mer judges from each party, but had not been voted on at this 
writing. The districts themselves were slightly modified after the 
1982 elections, but are essentially the same as those created by 
Professor Cain's committee in 1981 and roundly rejected by the 
California voters in 1982. One can hardly fault a book published 
in 1984 for not covering a 1984 initiative, and perhaps missing 
those of 1983 and 1982 is more the publisher's fault than the au-
3. 8. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 114, 129 (1984). 
4. Id. at 133. 
5. /d. at 118-19. 
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thor's. But missing the aftermath is a serious shortcoming in a 
book that tenders guidance on policy questions. 
Something about the districts created in 1981 by Professor 
Cain and other California Democrats (especially Congressman 
Philip Burton) rubbed California voters the wrong way in 1982. 
That something might be grossly misshapen gerrymanders, spread 
across mountains, deserts, and bays, chopping up cities and coun-
ties, and spliced together with narrow strips of beach or highway 
dividers. Or perhaps the districters, especially Burton, were too 
brazen in their efforts to favor their own and to punish their oppo-
sition, or in their inclination to boast about it. "Who will stop 
us?" Burton asked. 
Though he does not mention the 1982 initiatives, the author 
does mention media and Republican complaints about "ugly," 
noncompact districts, chopped-up cities, and favoritism towards 
incumbents and the dominant party. He presents prim, hypotheti-
cal examples6 to show that compactness, contiguity, and propor-
tionality can conflict with other goals of arguably equal value, 
such as "affirmative action" to enhance the power of the [Demo-
cratic] weak, blacks and Hispanics,? and "stability," "coherence," 
"cooperation," and "continuity" to enhance the power of the 
[Democratic] strong.s 
A comparison of a Cain hypothetical districting (Fig. 1) with 
a district actually created by the Alatorre committee (Fig. 2) and 
one designed by Philip Burton and adopted by the Alatorre com-
mittee (Fig. 3) may say more than words about the "aesthetics" of 
compactness and contiguity. 
As for protecting incumbents and Democrats, it has been nor-
mal for a party that controls the districting to deal itself 30-40% 
more seats per vote in close elections than a party that does not. It 
has also been normal to protect the seats of most incumbents, in-
cluding those of the minority party. Republicans controlled the 
districting in the 1950's; Democrats have controlled it since 1961, 
occasionally hindered by a Republican governor, as they were in 
1970 and are now, but helped by a Democratic state supreme 
court. They have profited plentifully from their control and per-
petuated it from one decade to the next. There have been years, 
such as 1966, 1968, and 1980, when Republicans won a majority 
of votes cast for congressional seats, but only a minority of seats. 
6. ld at 34-42. 
7. Id at 166-77. 
8. ld at 50-51, 187-88. 
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But the Burton reapportionment was more greedy than normal. 
In 1982, the Democrats, with only 2.8% more votes (the two-party 
percentages were 51.4% Democratic, 48.6% Republican), won 
165% more seats: 28 to the Republicans' 17. Stated differently, 
each Democratic vote was good for half again as many seats as 
each Republican vote. 
Public attitudes may be changing. Many in California be-
lieve that the net result of years of "normal" gerrymandering has 
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been a lessening of competitiveness, a lessening of turnover, a 
movement of both parties' legislators away from the center, a les-
sening of legislative responsiveness to changes in public opinion, 
and an increased recourse to initiatives and referenda to compen-
sate for legislative inaction. If these beliefs are true, they are 
highly pertinent to the question raised in the opening and closing 
chapters of The Reapportionment Puzzle: what should we do about 
reapportionment? One should also consider the alternative appor-
tionment systems that have since been broached to California vot-
ers as would-be or actual initiatives. But none of them figure in 
the book as live alternatives. The author concludes from his lim-
ited, 1981 evidence that reapportionment is "best treated in a 
political manner" by letting pluralism rule inside the legislature 
(but not outside of it) and with no partisan bickering after the job 
is done.9 Absent attention to the California aftermath, or to the 
experience of other states, this conclusion comes across as narrow, 
self-serving, and thinly supported. It looks too much like an ap-
peal for an "affirmative action gerrymander" for all groups, weak 
or strong, that the author favors. A case could be made for letting 
legislators continue to draw their own districts to their own advan-
tage, as they do in most states, as the least lousy of available alter-
natives. But The Reapportionment Puzzle does not make it. 
9. Id at 77, 188-91. 
